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716 HAYWARD I_juJ\IBER & INv. Co. v. BrscAILUZ [47 C.2d 
and for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion 
in that case, I ·would affirm the judgment of the trial court 
here. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L.A. No. 24226. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1957.] 
HAYWARD LUMBER AND INVESTMENT COMPANY 
(a Corporation), Appellant, v. E. W. BISCAILUZ et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Process-Definition.-An order of court purporting to re-
lease an attachment "as to all property except $2,000.00 in 
bank account" comes within the definition of "process" in Gov. 
Code, § 26660, as including all "orders of courts of justice," 
or judicial officers. 
[2] Sheriffs- Liability. -Generally, a sheriff assuming to act 
virtute officii warrants that he is possessed of such authority 
and, if not authorized, is liable to persons who suffer damage 
from steps taken under the belief that he was. 
[3] !d.-Service of Process.-In the service of process the sheriff 
is responsible only for unreasonably or not reasonably execut-
ing it; he must act with reasonable diligence, and reasonable 
diligence depends on the particular facts. 
[4] !d.-Liability-Release of Property.-Where in an attachment 
suit in the superior court defendant's attached bank account 
would have been sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's demand, the 
court ordered a partial release, which order did not contain 
any direction to the sheriff and was not entered in the perma-
nent minutes until a week after its date, the county clerk 4 
days after its entry issued his certificate reciting that notice 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 1; Am.Jur., 
Process, § 2. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Sheriffs, Police and Constables, § 37 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 13; Am.Jur., Sheriffs, 
Police and Constables, § 46 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Process,§ 1; [2] Sheriffs,§ 15; [3] 
Sheriffs, § 12; [ 4, 10] Sheriffs, § 18; Sheriffs, §§ 1, 12; [ 6] 
Sheriffs, § 16; [7] Records, § 43; [8] Attachment, § 75; [9] At-
tachment, § 55. 
,Jan. HAYWARD VexiBER & lNv. Co. v. BrscAILUZ 
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release order was served upon plaintiff's at-
aftpr its date and that no bond eontinuing lien 
within 5 of the date of said order, and that 
elapsed from the date of its service, but 
the date of entry in the permanent minutes, 
in reliance on the certificate sent to the bank 
his partial relPase order·~while plaintiff had appealed and 
timely filed an undertaking to continue the entire attachment 
in force in compliance with Code Civ. Proc., § 946~the 
sheriff's conduct was not as a matter of law a breach of an 
absolute rather, presents a question of mixed law and 
fact as to whether the standard of diligence required of 
sheriffs in the exigency of the case was observed, i.e., a que~>­
tion of negligence. 
[5] !d.-Nature of Office: Service of Process.-A sheriff is a minis-
terial officer, not a judicial one, and is justified in executing 
all process and orders regnlar on their face and executed by 
competent authority, whatever may be the defect in the pro-
ceedings on which they were issued. (Code Civ. Proc., § 262.1.) 
[6] Id.-Liabilities.-Unless there is a clear absence of jurisdic-
tion on the part of the court issuing process, it is sufficient 
to protect a sheriff if on the face of the process it appears to 
be valid in the judgment of an ordinarily intelligent and in-
formed layman. 
[7] Records-Effect as Evidence.-It is a part of the duties of 
a clerk of court (Gov. Code, §§ 26800, 26803, 26831-26833; 
Code Civ. Proc., §§ 153, subd. 5, 1892, 1893, 1904, 1905) to make 
and certify copies of the records and papers in his keeping, 
and where such duty is imposed on him by law his certificate 
may be accepted as conclusive of the facts recited therein. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1893.) 
[8] Attachment-Release of Attachment-Duty of Sheriff.-The 
sheriff is bound to respect and carry out the court's order re-
leasing an attachment which has been levied by him, although 
the order for release is not specifically directed to him, when 
a duly authenticated copy is placed in his hands (if he is en-
titled to rely on it at all) just as he is bound where the order 
is specifically addressed to him. 
[9] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Appeal-Stay Pending 
AppeaL-An appeal does not continue an attachment in force 
unless it is perfected within five days after written notice of 
the entry of the order appealed from. (Code Civ. Proc., § 946.) 
[10] Sheriffs-Liability-Release of Property.-The sheriff was 
justified in ordering a garnishee bank to release defendant's 
funds held by it, or, at most, a question of his negligence as 
distinguished from an absolute breach of official duty is pre-




the order had 
cate that "no Bond ,_,vuc"cuu 
of the date said 
from 
further statement in such certifi-
lien has been filed ... within 
support the 
conclusion that the order had become final. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
.nL'"''"''v" County. I1ouis H. Burke, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover from sheriff, his deputies and their sure-
ties a sum of money alleged to have been lost by reason of 
breach of duty by defendant officers acting in their official 
capacity. Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
Philip T. Lyons and Leroy B. Lorenz for Appellant. 
Morrison, Foerster, Holloway, Shuman & Clark, J. F. 
Shuman and Scott L. Harrington as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Appellant. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Wil-
liam E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, Crider, Tilson 
& Ruppe, Donald E. Ruppe, Sims & Wallbert and James H. 
Sims for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judg-
ment, rendered by the court sitting without a jury, in its 
action to recover from defendant sheriff of Los Angeles 
County, two of his deputies, 1 and the sureties upon their 
respective bonds, a sum of money which plaintiff claims to 
have lost by reason of an alleged breach of duty by the de-
fendant officers acting in their official capacity. 
Plaintiff contends that the sheriff, acting through his 
deputies, wrongfully ordered the Bank of America, herein-
after referred to as the bank, to release from attachment 
certain funds held by the bank, and that the bank complied 
1 The complaint names both J. D. Brady and C. G. Traughber as deputy 
sheriffs; the action appears to haYe been dismissed as to Deputy Traugh-
ber before trial. 
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obtained 
upon asserted breach 
absolute in from which breach lia~ 
matter of law. We have ~v""'-"'LlU 
for reasons hereinafter that the sheriff was not guilty 
of breach of absolute in release of the funds 
and so, upon is not liable for any loss which 
resulted and that the should be affirmed. 
Plaintiff had brought an action recovery of a 
money Construction Products Corporation, 
hereinafter sometimes termed the corporation. A writ of 
attachment was issued in that action and levied by defendant 
sheriff upon the account of the corporation in the bank. The 
bank reported to the sheriff that it held in the account 
$6,858.14. 
The following chronology of events then occurred: 
June 1, 1951: Upon motion of the corporation, the superior 
court ordered a release of the attachment as to all moneys 
held by the bank and owing to the corporation in excess of 
$2,000. minutes of the court do not expressly state 
whether a formal and signed order was, was not, or 
was to be, filed. See rule 2 (b), Rules on Appeal.) 
,June 8, 1951: The above described order was entered m 
the permanent minutes of the court. 
,June 11, 1951: Plaintiff appealed from the above men-
tioned order and filed an undertaking to continue the attach-
ment in force pending the appeal. (This was timely, within 
five days after entry of the order, in compliance with section 
946 of the Code of Civil Procedure.) 
June 12, 1951: The clerk of the superior court issued the 
following certificate: 
''I, HAROLD J. County Clerk and Clerk of the 
Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the 
County of Los Angeles, do hereby certify: 
"That the Court, in Department 35 thereof, on June 1, 
1951, ordered: 
'' ' ... Jl,fotion of Defendant to Discharge, Dissolve andjor 
reduce in amount \Vrit of Attachment come on for hearing; 
[listing' .... Motion to dissolve attachment is 
granted in part; Attachment released as to all property ex-
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cept $2,000.00 in bank account with [particular branch of 
Bank of America].' 
"That Notice of said Order was Berved upon [attorneys for 
plaintiff] on June 4, 1951 ; 
''That no Bond Continuing lien has been filed in this 
action within 5 days of the date of said order, and that more 
than 5 clays have elapsed from the date of service of said 
Order; 
"IN WITNEss WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the Seal of said Superior Court this 12th day of June, 
1951. 
"HAROLD J. OsTLY, ... By [signed] H. J. Wilson Deputy. 
[Seal of Court.] '' 
June 12, 1951: Also on this elate the sheriff, in reliance 
upon the clerk's above set forth certificate, sent the following 
''order to release'' to the bank: 
" [Official letterhead of the sheriff's office. Name of case. 
Addressed to Bank of America, particular branch involved.] 
You are hereby notified that I have this day released the 
following described personal property held by you, and at-
tached by virtue of writ(s) issued in the above entitled action, 
to-wit: All monies over and above the sum of $2,000.00. 
"E. W. BrscAILUZ, Sheriff By [signed] J. D. Brady 
Deputy Sheriff." 
Upon receipt of this release the bank permitted the attach-
ment debtor to withdraw from its account all moneys in ex-
cess of $2,000. Subsequently, the attaching creditor (plaintiff) 
obtained a reversal of the order partially releasing the at-
tachment, and thereafter recovered a judgment of approxi-
mately $5,000 against Construction Products Corporation. 
Under the writ of execution on this judgment the sheriff col-
lected $2,000 from the bank but advised plaintiff that he had 
released all funds iu excess of that sum. In the meantime the 
debtor had become bankrupt. 
Plaintiff then filed the present action against the sheriff, 
his deputies, and the sureties upon their respective bonds, 
to recover the unsatisfied portion of the judgment. As above 
indicated, the court entered judgment in favor of all defend-
ants, and this appeal followed. The controlling question is 
the nature of the sheriff's duty in the premises. Is it abso-
lute or may it be satisfied by due diligence 1 We conclude 
that it is not absolute and, hence, may be satisfied by due 
diligence. 
The following cluHes are specifically enjoined on the sheriff: 
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He ''shall attend all superior courts held within his county 
and obey all lawful orders and directions of all courts held 
within his county" (Gov. Code, § 26603) and he "shall serve 
all process and notices in the manner prescribed by law" 
(Gov. Code, § 26608.) [1] As used in reference to the duties 
of the sheriff, " 'Process' includes all writs, warrants, sum-
mons, and orders of courts of justice, or judicial officers.'' 
(Gov. Code, § 26660; italics added.) The order of the court 
purporting to release the attachment "as to all property ex-
cept $2,000.00 in bank account" comes within the definition 
of ''process'' above quoted. 
[2] As a general rule ''A sheriff assuming to act virtute 
officii warrants that he is possessed of such authority, and 
if not authorized, is liable to persons who have suffered 
damage from steps taken under the belief that he was." ( 47 
Am.Jur. 848, § 37; see also, id. 855, § 46.) [3] In respect 
to attachment levies it has been held in California that ''The 
Sheriff's liability rests on his breach of official duty. As he 
is bound to perform his duty, so is he responsible to every 
one who may be injured by his failure to discharge it. In 
respect to the execution of process these official duties are 
well defined by law. The law is reasonable in this, as in all 
other things. It holds public officers to a strict performance 
of their respective duties. It tolerates no wanton disregard of 
these duties. It sanctions no negligence; but it requires no 
impossibilities and imposes no unconscionable exactions. When 
process of attachment or execution comes to the hands of the 
Sheriff, he must obey the exigency of the writ . . . But he 
is not held to the duty of starting on the instant after receiv-
ing a writ, to execute it, without regard to anything else 
than its instant execution. Reasonable diligence is all that 
is required of him in such instances. But this reasonable 
diligence depends upon the particular facts in connection with 
the duty. [Italics added.] . . . We have seen that the Sheriff 
is not absolutely responsible for not executing process of this 
sort. He is responsible for unreasonably and not reasonably 
executing such process." (Whitney v. Butterfield (1859), 
13 Cal. 335, 338, 340 [73 Am.Dec. 584); see alRo Ayres v. 
Burr (1901), 132 Cal. 125, 130 r64 P. 1201; Sheehy v. Graves 
(1881), 58 Cal. 449, 455.) While the statements above quoted 
were made in relation to the failure of the sheriff to orig-
inally levy an attachment in time to secure sufficient of the 
defendants' property to satisfy plaintiffs' claim because a 
writ subsequently issued in the action of another creditor 
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tion of ""'"'''' ,_,,, 
the cases hereinafter discussed. 
[5] It is established that a sheriff ministerial 
not a judicial one Vallindras "Massachusetts etc. Ins. Co. 
(1954), 42 CaL2d 154 P.2d ), and is 
in executing ''all process and orders on their face and 
issued by whatever may be the defect in 
the proceedings upon which were issued." (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 262.1.) [6] "In whether process and 
orders are 'regular on their face' so far as the of such 
an officer is concerned, the following statement from Aetna 
Ins. Co. v. Blumenthal (1943), 128 Con 553 A.2d 
751], is pertinent: 'When we speak of process "valid on its 
face,'' in considering whether it is sufficient to protect an 
officer, we do not mean that its validity is to be determined 
upon the basis of scrutiny by a trained legal mind; nor is it to 
be judged in light of facts outside its provisions which the 
officer may know. [Citations.] Unless there is a clear ab-
sence of jurisdiction it is sufficient if upon its face it appears 
to be valid in the judgment of an ordinarily intelligent and in-
formed layman. To hold otherwise would mean that an 
officer must often act at his peril or delay until he has had 
an opportunity to search out legal niceties of procedure, and 
... ''a result subjecting him to constant danger of liability 
would be an intolerable hardship to him, and inevitably de-
tract from the prompt and efficient performance of his public 
duty."'" (Vallindms v. lJ!lassach1tsctts etc. Ins. Co. (1954), 
supra, 42 Cal.2d 149, 154 [7].) 
The sheriff here relied on a certificate of the clerk of court 
which appeared complete and regular on its face, to the effect 
that by order of the court the attachment was partially dis-
solved and (to an "ordinarily and informed lay-
man") that the order dissolving and releasing it in part was 
final. [7] It is a part of the clerk's duties Gov. Code, 
§ § 26800, 26803, 2G831, ; Code Civ. 153, 
subd. 5, 1892, 
of the records and papers 
duty is imposed on him by 
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attachment. Pursuant to this 
of the time for appeal, 
faith surrendered the money to the 
made no attempt to the order 
from a determining title 
to be in a third person. Regardless of appel-
in the latter the marshal was held 
before the appeal period had expired, 
where he acted reliance on the court's order which was 
valid face. 
In Pirst Nat. Bank (1931), 112 Cal.App. 665 
P. , recovered judgment, notice of appeal 
but no bond staying execution was provided. Execu-
tion was issued and levied by the sheriff. 'I'he judgment 
debtor then filed a bond for the purpose of staying execution, 
and the that the defendant had filed a "good 
'' ordered the sheriff to return the prop-
debtor. The sheriff promptly returned 
The next the plaintiff filed notice ex-
snreties on the stay bond, and the sureties 
so the court ordered the sheriff to proceed 
execution. But the sheriff was 
unable to recover the property he had released, and the 
plaintiff sued the sheriff for the resultant loss. The court 
stated 669-671 of 112 ) : "Even when this 
bond to exeeution has been filed, t:1e sheriff is not au-
thorized to release in his possession upon which he 
has levied an execution unless the judgment creditor 
fails for a period of five after the filing thereof to object 
to the of the sureties thereon. . . . 
"Pursuant to the statute last quoted [Code Civ. Proc., 
§ it is the foregoing order of the court directing 
the sheriff to return the property to the judgment debtor 
was premature and unauthorized. But the court did have 
jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . . Although the order 
LuMBER & INv. Co. v. BrscAILuz [47 C.2d 
erroneous of the law and an 
it nevertheless furnishes a com-
for the sheriff to return the property since 
no evidE~1ce of its appears upon the face of the 
order. ... \Vhen the order or process appears to be regular 
and valid upon its and to have been executed by competent 
authority, it is of a sheriff to execute it .... The 
sheriff may limit his to an inspection of the writ .... 
''In the case the sheriff appears to have acted 
in perfect faith. Since the order of the court stated 
that 'a and sufficient bond ... to stay the writ of 
execution,' had been filed, and since the order fails to state 
when the undertaking was filed, the sheriff was justified in 
assuming that the bond conformed in every way to the re-
quirements of the law, and that the five days allowed by 
statute for to the sufficiency of the sureties had 
elapsed. 'fhe order also specifically directed the sheriff 'to 
return any and all property to the judgment debtor which 
he may have in his custody.' This order was valid on its 
face. The sheriff is a mere ministerial officer. He is not 
required, at his peril, to search the records to dispute specific 
statements which are recited in a court order directing him to 
perform a ministerial duty.'' 
The language quoted from the last two cases is per-
suasive. It is true that in those cases the court specifically 
ordered the sheriff to release the property, while here the 
court ordered the release of the attachment in part but gave 
no orders directed to the sheriff. However, as has been here-
inabove indicated, the sheriff is the officer who is charged 
with the duty of executing such orders; i.e., he levies and 
releases attachments and executions, serves all "process" of 
the court placed in his hands, and returns to the court an 
account of his actions. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 539a, 540, 
542, 543, 546, 554, 556, 558, 682, 682a, 946; Gov. Code, 
§§ 26608, 26609.) [8] The sheriff would be bound to respect 
and carry out the court's order releasing the attachment when 
a duly authenticated copy was placed in his hands (if he was 
entitled to rely on it at all) just as he is bound where the 
order is specifically addressed to him. (See Clark v. Superior 
Cont·t (1918), 37 Cal.App. 732, 734 [174 P. 681] .) 
[9] An appeal does not continue an attachment in force 
unless it is perfected within five days after written notice of 
the entry of the order appealed from. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 946.) [10] The certificate of the clerk in this case stated 
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that "Notice of said Order [releasing the attachment in part] 
was served upon" the for plaintiff, and tl1at "more 
than 5 days have elapsed from the date of service of said 
Order." It could reasonably have been belieYed the sheriff 
that the notice served was the "written notiee of the 
of the order'' provided for by section 946 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, and that the time for effeetive appeal from 
the order had passed. The further statement the certificate 
that "no Bond Continuing lien has been .. within 5 
days of the date of said order" would further support the 
conclusion that the order had become finaL First Nat. 
Bank v. M.cOoy (1931), supra, 112 Cal.App. 665, 671.) 
For the reasons above stated, we conclude that the sheriff 
was justified as a matter of law in ordering the release, 
or that, at the most, there is presented a question of negligence 
(a question of mixed law and fact as to the exercise of due 
diligence in the performance of official duty) and that in 
either event this appeal must result in affirmance.2 
Other questions are argued or suggested by the parties 
but for reasons indicated need not be resolved. Inasmuch 
as the bank is not a party to the aetion we need not con-
sider whether the bank was justified in relying on the sheriff's 
release or whether as against the bank the sheriff would be 
estopped to deny his authority to release the funds. 3 (See 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1962, par. 3; DavenJJOTt v. StTatton (1944), 
24 Cal.2d 232,243 [6] [149 P.2d 4].) For a similar reason-
the county clerk not having been made a party-it is not 
necessary to consider whether liability should devolve upon 
the clerk for issuing a certifieate whieh, although perhaps 
accurate in all that it did state, stated only part of the perti-
nent faets when the records of the elerk disclosed other faets 
whieh had a material bearing on the matter to whieh the 
eertifieate related (i.e., that the order was entered in the 
permanent minutes on June 8, 1951, and that a notiee of 
2 Plaintiff in its brief expressly disclaims reliance on any theory of 
negligence; it says, ''Nowhere in the pleadings or the evidence in this 
case is there any mention of any negligence or any aet which, in itself, 
would constitute negligence ... As heretofore indicated, negligence is 
not involved in this case, by either pleading or evidence ... '' 
"The sheriff, through his deputy, sent an "order to release" to the 
bank, on an official form used for the specillc of releasing gar-
nishments, pursuant to what had been a practice. It 
appears that the sheriff expected and intended the hank should rely 
and act on the order to release and change its position, as it did. 
concurred. 
concludes that 
imposed upon the sheriff his was 
no breach of official the of his 
unauthorized order the account. It is 
submitted that this conclusion is erroneous and without sup-· 
port in the authorities cited in the 
First, the cases which are cited for the that 
a sheriff is justified in upon a court order if the 
latter is "valid on its face" have no under the instant 
circumstances. In each of those cases, the officer involved 
acted under a court order which directed him 
to act. In Vallinclras v. Massachusetts etc. Ins. 42 Cal.2d 
149 [265 P.2d 907], the court issued an order directing the 
sheriff to imprison Vallindras for eontempt. The order was 
later determined to be erroneous and Vallindras sought re-
covery from the shrriff for false Recovery 
was denied on the ground that the sheriff was entitled to 
rely upon an on its face and issued competent 
authority, without an as possible 
defects in the rise to the order. In O'Br•ien 
v. Thomas, 21 CaLApp.2d 765 P.2d 1370], the 
court ordered the marshal to release money held under an 
attachment. The marshal released the money without await-
ing expiration of the time for It was held that he 
was justified in relying npon the court order. In First Nat. 
Bank v. McCoy, 1]2 665 P. , the court 
ordered the sheriff to return attached to the de-
fendant after the latter had filed a stay bond. The sheriff 
returned the property before the time in >vhich plaintiff had 
to except to the sureties on the bond had There-
after, the sureties failed to 'l'he 
justified the .court order 
was no order the sheriff 
account, hence, there was no compulsion upon the sheriff to 





and Code of 
that: "A 
and shall execute, 
orders face and issued by 
whateyer may be the defect in the pro-
upon which were issued'' cannot justify the 
action of the here for the reason that the court order 
did not call for ''service'' or ''execution'' the sheriff. 
As it did not direct the sheriff to take action. 
Neither into play any code section requiring 
the sheriff to act. In this latter respect the instant case 
<liffers from Clark v. 37 Oal.App. 732 [174 
P. (181], cited the for the proposition that: "The 
sheriff would be bound and carry out the court's 
order :releasing the attachment when a duly authenticated 
copy was in his hands ... just as he is bound where 
the order is addressed to him." In the Clark 
case, the sheriff refused to release on the record an attach-
ment of real after the trial court ordered a nonsuit 
and the failed to within the prescribed time. 
It was held that the sheriff could be compelled, by a writ of 
to release the attachment because of a code section 
§ 4157 subd. 7, now Gov. Oodc, § 26606) which 
declares tllat: "'rhc sheriff shall release on the record all 
attachments of real when the attachment placed in 
his hand l1as been released or discharged." (Emphasis added.) 
rrherc is no however, requiring the sheriff 
to order the of a garnishment (Johnston v. Jones, 
P. ) , therefore, the statement in 
that the sheriff m this ease was bound 
to carry out the court's order the attachment is 
the general rule quoted 
("A sheriff assuming to act virtute 
officii warrants that he is of such authority, and if 
not auth01·ized, is liable to persons vvho have suffered damage 
728 HAYWARD LmiBER & INv. Co. v. BrscArLuz [47 C.2d 
from belief that he was''), the plaintiff 
from the sheriff and his deputy for the 
loss occasioned their unauthorized conduct. This con-
elusion is further supported by the ease law in this state to 
the effect that a sheriff who releases attached property with-
out commits a breach of his duty and is responsible 
to the for the resultant loss. (Sanfm·d v. Boring, 
12 CaL ; Hesser v. Rowley, 139 CaL 410, 413 [73 P. 
138 Cal.App.2d 586, 592 [292 P.2d 
these cases dealt with the wrongful release 
in the sheriff's custody, the principles 
therein would apply to the wrongful release of 
garnisheed property. 
The indication in the majority opinion that the only possible 
basis of liability is that of negligence (which theory plaintiff 
expressly disclaimed) is likewise without support. This ques-
tion arose in Reynolds v. Lerman, supm, 138 Cal.App.2d 586, 
in connection with the applicability of Government Code sec-
tion 1981 which requires the filing of a claim as a prerequisite 
to the maintenance of an action for the negligence of a public 
officer. In that case the sheriff had attached certain personal 
property and, without authority, sold it for storage charges. 
'rhe owner sued the sheriff for damages for failure to ''safely 
keep" the property. The contention that this amounted to 
a charge of negligence by the sheriff requiring the filing of 
a claim was rejected. The court held that it was not a 
question of: the "safety" of the keeping bnt of a violation of 
the plaintiff's right to have the sheriff "keep" the property 
and that the unauthorized violation of this duty amounted to 
conversion, an intentional, not a neg·ligent tort. Similarly, 
the unauthorized release of the attached funds was intentional, 
not negligent. In Sarafini v. City & County of San Francisco, 
143 Cal.App.2d 570, 574-575 [300 P.2d 44], the plaintiff sued 
police officers who, acting upon erroneous information, had 
broken into her apartment. It was held that the claim statute 
was inapplicable because the act was deliberate although it 
was based upon the negligent belief that illegal activities 
were being conducted in the apartment. Here, defendant 
Brady's conduct in ordering the release was a deliberate, 
voluntary act although he apparently acted under the negli-
gently acquired belief that the release was authorized. Ac-
cordingly, relief: should not be denied on the ground that his 
conduct >vas merely negligent. 
Further arguments of the defendants, referred to in the 
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majority opinion, are likewise without merit. Inasmuch as 
the court order, even as it on the clerk's certificate, 
did not require any action by the sheriff, force of the order 
or of any statute, the of the liability to the clerk 
for issuing an incomplete certificate is irrelevant. As to the 
argument that the bank was not justified upon the 
purported release it suffices to say that such a result 
would east a burden upon the to continuously ex-
amine the myriad court records to ascertain effectiveness 
of any attachments upon held by him. To conclude 
that the garnishee may not rely upon an served by an 
officer of the court, could only result in confusion of the here-
tofore workable practiees the release of attaehments. 
For the reason that the release order was unjustified by 
either court order or statute, I am of the opinion that the 
sheriff is liable for the loss from his breach 
of official duty and, accordingly, I would reverse the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 19552. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1957.] 
INGA A. BRANDELIUS et al., Appellants, v. CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents. 
[1] New Trial-Discretion-Review.·-The granting of a motion 
for new trial rests so completely within the discretion of 
the trial court that its action will not be disturbed unless a 
manifest and unmistakable ahuse of discretion clearly appears. 
[2] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New TriaL-On 
appeal all presumptions are in favor of an order granting new 
trial. 
[3] !d.-Grounds of Decision Below-Order Granting New TriaL-
An order granting new trial will be affirmed if it may be sus-
tained on any ground, although the reviewing court might have 
ruled differently in the first instance. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 13; Am.Jur., New Trial, §§ 201, 
202. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] New Trial, § 12(3); [2] Appeal and 
Error, §1197; [3] Appeal and Error §1014; [4] Carriers, §61; 
[5] Carriers, §140; [6] Carriers, §141; [7] Death, §42; [8, 10-15] 
Negligence,§ 48; [9, 16, 17] Negligence,§ 217; 19] New Trial, 
§ 124; [20] Carriers, § 147. 
